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Federal Reserved Water Rights in
Wilderness Areas: A Progress Report on
a Western Water Fight
Introduction
The federal reserved water rights doctrine has been denounced as "a
wild card that may be played at any time,"' "a blank check that may be
filled in for any amount,"2 and "a federal intrusion of unquantified
rights." 3 Perhaps most colorfully, the doctrine has been described as "a
first mortgage of undetermined and undeterminable magnitude which
hangs like a Sword of Damocles over every title to water rights on every
stream which touches a federal reservation." 4
The judicially created federal reserved water rights doctrine allows
the federal government to claim water rights for land it withdraws from
the public domain and reserves for a specific purpose. 5 The doctrine is
based on the federal government's powers under the Property Clause6
and the Supremacy Clause7 of the United States Constitution. Several
I. F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 160 (1971).
2. Id.
3. Additions to the National Wilderness PreservationSystem: Hearings on H.R. 42 and
H.R. 4233 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interiorand Insular
Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4233] (statement of
David H. Getches, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources) (not yet
published at the time of this writing; copy on file with The Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly).
4. F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 117 n.34 (quoting address by Northcutt Ely to National
Water Commission (Nov. 6, 1969)). Damocles was a legendary courtier of ancient Syracuse.
To give him a lesson in the perils of a ruler's life, a king seated Damocles at a feast beneath a

sword hung by a single hair.
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323 (9th ed. 1986).

5. See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-600 (1963); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
A "withdrawal" of land refers to a statute, an executive order, or an administrative order
that changes the designation of a parcel of federally-owned land from "available" to "unavailable" for homesteading or resource exploitation. A "reservation" denotes a dedication of withdrawn land to a specified purpose. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND &
RESOURCES LAW

239 (2d ed. 1986).

6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Under the Property Clause, Congress is given the
power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States. .. "
7. U.S CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution and laws of
the United States are "the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
[125]
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states and private water users8 have criticized the doctrine because federal claims to water supplies mean less water is available for them.
Water users in the semiarid West express the most vehement criticisms
9
because competition for the West's limited water is especially keen.
Because their water supplies are limited, western states have struggled for decades among themselves for rights to interstate waters' ° and
with the federal government for rights to intrastate waters.I' To complicate matters, western states also must contend with the federal government's ownership of vast areas of land
at high elevations, where
12
substantial amounts of water originate.
This struggle for water between western states and the federal government escalated in 1985 when a federal district court held for the first
time that the federal government could claim reserved water rights for
twenty-four wilderness areas located- in Colorado.13 The Secretary of
Agriculture and other federal defendants appealed the decision;14 however, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction
and remanded the case to the district court. 5 On June 3, 1987, the dis8. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978) ("In the arid parts of
the West... claims to water for use on federal reservations inescapably vie with other public
and private claims for the limited quantities to be found in the rivers and streams.").
10. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (apportionment of the Pecos
River between Texas and New Mexico); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (compact between Colorado and New Mexico regarding the Vermejo River); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963) (struggle between Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah
for use of the Colorado River).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
12. The United States now owns approximately 732 million acres-about one-third of the
nation's total land. Although federal public lands are located in all states, they comprise especially large portions of the eleven "western states": Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. G. COGGINS &
C. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 11. Roughly 80 million acres constitute the National Wilderness Preservation System. Shepard, The Scope of Congress' Constitutional Power Under the
Property Clause, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 483 n.22 (1984). More than 60% of the
average annual water yield in the eleven western states derives from federal reservations.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978).
13. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985) (Sierra Club I). Plaintiff
Sierra Club brought this action against John Block, the Secretary of Agriculture, Max Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service, William Clark, Secretary of the Interior, and Russell Dickenson, Director of the National Park Service. Several parties intervened as defendants:
Mountain States Legal Foundation, the Colorado Cattlemen's Association, the Colorado Farm
Bureau, the National Cattlemen's Association, the city of Denver, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, and the Colorado Water Congress.
14. Sierra Club v. Lyng, Nos. 86-1153, 86-1154, 86-1155, slip op. (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 1986).
By the time the original action was filed and an appeal was taken, Richard Lyng had replaced
Block as the Secretary of Agriculture.
15. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that an appellate court has jurisdiction only over final
decisions of district courts pursuant to federal statute. In determining whether an order is
appealable, "appellate courts look at whether the [district court's] order ends the litigation and
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trict court
again upheld federal reserved water rights in wilderness
6
areas.1
The district court's decisions raise important constitutional issues
regarding the scope of the federal government's power to claim water
rights for federal reservations such as wilderness areas, while virtually
ignoring state water law. The reserved water rights doctrine is a matter
17
of federal law and therefore is not subject to state water law limitations.
Federal claims to water in wilderness areas thus could usurp state claims
to the same water under the constitutional doctrine of preemption.
In Part I, this Note examines the constitutional preemption doctrine
as it applies to federal reserved water rights. Part II surveys the judicial
history and development of the reserved water rights doctrine. Part III
examines the conflict between the federal reserved water rights doctrine
and the water law of the western states. Part IV explores the practical
implications of applying the doctrine to federal wilderness areas. Part V
considers the federal legislative response to applying the federal reserved
water rights doctrine in wilderness areas. Finally, in Part VI, this Note
proposes a legislative solution to the problems inherent in extending the
doctrine to wilderness areas.
I.

Federal Preemption of State Water Law

The federal government's power to preempt state law derives from
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which declares that the laws
and Constitution of the United States are "the Supreme Law of the
Land."" 8 Under this clause, the federal government may preempt state
law by federal legislation that expresses a preemptive intent 9 or fairly
implies such an intent.20
In general, the Supreme Court has found an implied preemptive intent when (1) the legislative history of the federal regulation or regulatory scheme indicates a preemptive intent;2 ' (2) the federal regulatory
scheme is so pervasive that it is reasonable to infer that Congress left no
leaves nothing to be done except execute the judgment." Id., slip op. at 3. The court concluded that the Colorado district court's order was not final under this standard, because the
district court could still render a final judgment after it reviewed the plan it had ordered the
federal defendants to submit. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
16. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987) (Sierra Club II).
17. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2. See supra note 7.
19. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding that it is wellestablished that, within constitutional limits, Congress may preempt state authority by using
express terms).
20. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-50 (1963).
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room to supplement it;22 (3) the nature of the regulation or the subject
matter requires nationwide uniformity; 23 or (4) the state law impedes
Congress' ability to fully attain the objectives of the federal law.2 4
Although the Constitution enables the federal government to preempt state law under these limited circumstances, states have reacted
with particular hostility to the federal government's assertion of water
rights under its protection power. This is especially true in the semiarid
West, where water rights have long been recognized as property rights
often more valuable than the land on which the water is used.2 5

The central inquiry in the preemption analysis is whether the federal
government intended to supersede state law, either explicitly or implicitly, in the particular area of regulation.26 Under the federal reserved
water rights doctrine, courts consider two factors in determining whether
the federal government intended to preempt state water law. First, because the federal government rarely expresses an intent to claim the
water appurtenant to federal land when it reserves the land, courts must
determine whether the federal government impliedly intended to reserve
the water.27 Second, courts must consider the federal government's
traditional deference to state water law.28 Courts considering these two
22. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
23. FloridaLime, 373 U.S. at 143.
24. See, e.g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall recognized
the hierarchy of the federal system, stating that as to
"such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but...
interfere with, or are contrary to the law of Congress, made in the pursuance of the
constitution.... [i]n every such case, the act of Congress... is supreme; and the law
of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to
it."
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-94 (1978).

25. City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151 (1952). As one writer
has noted:
In the West, lack of water is the central fact of existence, and a whole culture
and set of values have grown up around it. In the East, to "waste" water is to consume it needlessly or excessively, In the West, to waste water is not to consume itto let it flow by unimpeded and undiverted down rivers.
M. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 12 (1986).

26. See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
27. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978) ("Congress has seldom
expressly reserved water for use on ... withdrawn lands."). For examples of federal legislation
that withdraw land without any declaration as to federal water rights, see the American Antiquities Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1933) (establishing national monuments) and the
National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1946) (establishing national parks).
28. The leading statement by the Supreme Court on congressional deference to state water
law is California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), which affirmed the power of the California State Water Resources Control Board to impose conditions on a federal water project
before the federal government could impound water for a dam. See also California Or. Power
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factors have examined the purposes of the federal legislation that reserved the land to determine whether the federal government also intended to reserve water rights.2 9
To understand how the preemption doctrine applies to water conflicts in the West, it is necessary first to define the federal reserved water
rights doctrine, and then to compare it to the water laws of the western
states.
II.

The Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine

Under the United States Constitution, the federal government has
the power to control interstate commerce, provide for the common defense, make war, enter into treaties, control interstate compacts, manage
federal property, levy taxes, and spend money for the general welfare of
the country. 0 The federal government has used each of these powers at
one time or another to justify its involvement in developing and regulating water resources.3 '
Courts have held that both the Commerce Clause 2 and the Property Clause 33 authorize the federal government to reserve water for federal lands.3 4 The more commonly accepted constitutional basis for the
doctrine, however, is the Property Clause coupled with the Supremacy
Clause.3 5 This combination is based on the federal government's ownership of the public domain as both an ordinary proprietor and as a superior sovereign.3 6 The Property Clause permits the federal government,
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 n.2 (1934) ("Congress ...has repeatedly recognized the supremacy of state law in respect of the acquisition of water for the reclamation of public lands of the United States and lands of its Indian wards."); In re Green River
Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127, 148 (D. Utah 1956) ("[T]here is a long-standing federal
legislative policy of conformity by the federal government with state laws concerning the acquisition, ownership and administration of its water rights.").
29. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 143-46 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587-98 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
31. See generally Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of

"ClarifyingLegislation", 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 423, 445 (1966).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2. See supra note 6.
34. See generally Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) ("Reservation of
water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause ...which permits federal regulation of
navigable streams, and the Property Clause ...which permits federal regulation of federal
lands."); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) ("We have no doubt about the power
of the United States under [the Commerce and Property Clauses] to reserve water rights for its
reservations and its property.").
2. See supra note 7.
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
36. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).

130

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 15:125

acting as an ordinary landowner, 7 to use a share of the navigable and
nonnavigable waters on the public lands. 38 Acting as a superior sovereign, the federal government has authority under the Supremacy Clause
to assert
water rights that take precedence over the rights of other water
39
users.

A.

The Development of the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine

The Supreme Court first alluded to the reserved water rights doctrine in dictum in United States v. Rio GrandeDam and IrrigationCompany.4" In Rio Grande, decided in 1899, the Court considered whether
an irrigation company, acting pursuant to state authority, could be enjoined from diverting water at a rate which severely diminished the navigability of a river. The Court held that the relevant state law was limited
by the federal government's superior power over navigable waters.4 1 In
dictum, the Court noted:
[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress a state cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the
owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its
waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of
the government property.4 2
It was not until 1908 that the Supreme Court clarified the reserved
water rights doctrine. In Winters v. United States,4 3 the Court held that
when Congress created the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in 1888, it
not only set aside the land for the Indians, but also impliedly reserved
enough water to satisfy their needs.' The Court reasoned that Congress
must have intended to reserve the water simultaneously with the land
because without the water, the arid land would be practically useless to
the Indians. 5 Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, stated that "[t]he
power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
37. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the amount of land the federal government owns.
38. See Fairfax & Tarlock, No Waterfor the Woods: A CriticalAnalysis of United States
v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 512 (1979).
39. Commentators differ over which constitutional powers allow the federal government
to reserve water. Dean Trelease argues that the Supremacy Clause alone, without the Property
Clause, is the proper constitutional basis for the reserved rights doctrine. F. TRELEASE, supra
note 1, at 147 ("Reserved rights stem from the supremacy clause and the need for water to
carry out federal functions."). But cf.E. HANKS, FEDERAL STATE RIGHTS AND RELATIONS,
2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 102.1 (R. Clark ed. Supp. 1978) (criticizing Trelease's view
and opining that the federal government's power to usurp state-created rights must depend on

a preexisting ownership of interest.
40. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
41. Id. at 703.
42. Id.
43. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

44. Id. at 576.
45. Id.
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appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be." 4 6
The "Winters Doctrine", as the reserved water rights doctrine came
to be known, originally was thought to apply only to Indian reservations. 4 7 It was not until 1955 that the Court held the federal reserved
water rights doctrine applied to federal lands other than Indian reservations.4 8 In 1963, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California4 9 unequivocally extended the doctrine beyond Indian lands to include national
recreation areas, wildlife refuges, and national forests.5 Courts have
2
since applied the doctrine to military facilities,5 national monuments,
53 public waterholes, and mineral hot springs.54
parks,
national
B.

The Scope of the Doctrine

Courts have determined that the federal government has the power
to reserve water for federal lands. Recognizing Congress' power does
not, however, resolve the questions of how much water the federal government may reserve or when the federal right vests.
1.

Amount of Water Reserved

In Cappaert v. United States,5 5 the Supreme Court held that federal
intent is the decisive factor in determining whether a federal reservation
of public land impliedly includes a reserved water right. 6 The Court
stated that it would infer federal intent to reserve water if the previously
unclaimed waters were "necessary to accomplish the purposes for which
46. Id. at 577.
47. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. U. L. REv. 473, 475
(1977) (reserved rights were considered a "special quirk of Indian water law").
48. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (also known as the "Pelton
Dam" decision) (holding that the federal government had impliedly reserved water rights for
hydropower at Pelton Dam).
49. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
50. The Court stated:
The [Water] Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation of water
rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments
such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests. We agree with the conclusions of the Master that the United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the
future requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake
National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the Gila National Forest.
Id. at 601.
51. Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) (Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot, Mineral
County, Nev.).
52. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (Death Valley National Monument).
53. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982) (Rocky Mountain National Park).
54. Id.
55. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
56. Id. at 139.
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the reservation was created."57 In Cappaert,the Court examined a 1952
presidential proclamation which established Devil's Hole Cavern in Nevada as part of the Death Valley National Monument. Based on language in the proclamation suggesting that special protection be given to a
pool in the cavern, 8 the Court concluded that the proclamation was also
intended to reserve sufficient water to maintain the level of the pool.5 9
Two years later, in United States v. New Mexico," the Supreme
Court considered whether water rights are impliedly reserved when public land is designated as national forest. The Court ruled that when the
United States established the Gila National Forest in New Mexico, it
intended to reserve only that portion of the river flow through the forest
that was necessary to fulfill the prinftary purposes of the national forest.6 1
The Court noted that each time it had previously applied the federal reserved water rights doctrine, it had "carefully examined both the asserted
water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved,
and [had] concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." 6 2
To determine the primary purposes of the designation at issue in
New Mexico, the Court examined the Organic Administration Act of
1897,63 which authorized the creation of national forests. After reviewing the congressional debates on the Organic Administration Act, Justice
Rehnquist ruled for the majority that Congress had intended to reserve
national forests for two primary purposes-"[t]o conserve the water
flows [for downstream use], and to furnish a continuous supply of timber."' The Court then held that Congress had intended to reserve only
the amount of water necessary to fulfill these two purposes.65
The Court rejected the federal government's argument that Congress had also intended to reserve water for aesthetic, recreational, and
fish-preservation purposes.6 6 The legislative history of the Organic Ad57. Id.
58. Id. at 140 ("The Proclamation discussed the pool in Devil's Hole in four of the five
preambles and recited that the 'pool... should be given special protection.' ").
59. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 139-40.
60. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
61. Id. at 716-18.
62. Id. at 700.
63. Ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 471a-543h (1985). The
Act provides: "No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows,
and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States.. .

."

Id. § 475.

64. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707.
65. Id. at 702 ("Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express
deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the
necessary water.").
66. Id. at 705.
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ministration Act indicated that Congress created national forests only for
the two very narrow purposes;6 7 reserving water for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife-preservation concerns would exceed and
indeed conflict with the primary purposes of the Act.68
The Court buttressed its holding by comparing the language of the
Organic Administration Act to the broader language Congress had used
to authorize the establishment of national parks and fish and game sanctuaries. 69 In these latter instances, Congress had expressly indicated its
intent to preserve fish and wildlife.7 ° By comparison, the Court noted
that Congress had not expressed similar preservation concerns in the Organic Administration Act itself or during the debates over its adoption.
Further, when Congress intended to maintain minimum water flows in a
particular national forest, it expressed its intent directly, as in the case of
the Lake Superior National Forest. 7 1 Based on these comparisons, the
Court concluded that Congress intended to reserve water for the Gila
National Forest solely to maintain downstream water flows and timber
supplies, and not for any secondary purposes such as recreation.7 2
The Court emphasized in New Mexico that the originalpurposes of
the land reservation determined the scope of the reserved water right. In
1960, Congress enacted the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act
("MUSYA")7 3 which broadened the purposes of national forests. This
legislation expressly provides that national forests are to be administered
for, among other things, recreation and wildlife and fish preservation.7 4
Nonetheless, the Court concluded in New Mexico that Congress had not
intended to expand the reserved water rights doctrine to include these
new purposes.7 5 A House of Representatives Report accompanying
MUSYA stated that the new purposes were to be "supplemental to, but
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id. at 711-12.
69. Idat710-11.
70. Under the National Park Service Act of 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460ee (1976)), Congress provided that the "fundamental purposes
of the said parks, monuments, and reservations ... is to conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same...
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1, quoted in New Mexico,
438 U.S. at 709. In 1934, Congress authorized the establishment of fish and game sanctuaries
within national forests. 16 U.S.C. § 694 (1976). The Court in New Mexico reasoned that if the
Organic Administration Act was intended to "'improve and protect' fish and wildlife, the
1934 Act would have been unnecessary." New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 711.
71. 438 U.S. at 710.
72. Id. at 708.
73. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
(1985)).
74. MUSYA provides in part: "It is the policy of Congress that the national forests are
to be established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 528.
75. 438 U.S. at 713.
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not in derogation of" the original purposes set forth in the Organic Administration Act.7 6 According to the Court, this language indicated that
these later purposes were secondary to those specified in the Organic Ad-

ministration Act, and thus no additional federal water rights were impliedly reserved by MUSYA.7 7 The Court reasoned that reserving more
water could substantially lessen the amount of water available for irrigation and domestic use, "thereby defeating Congress' principal purpose of
securing favorable conditions of water flow."7 8
2.

When FederalReserved Water Rights Vest

In Winters v. United States,79 the Court held that the Indians' rights
to the water flowing through their reservation related back to the time of
the reservation's creation. The rule that federal reserved water rights
vest on the date the land was reserved was confirmed in Cappaert v.
United States. 0 Accordingly, a federal water right acquires a priority
date8 1 at the time of the land reservation, making the federal reserved
water right superior to the rights of water appropriaters who acquire
their water after the date of the federal reservation.8 2
C. Extending the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine to
Wilderness Areas
Following New Mexico, commentators debated whether the reserved
water rights doctrine should be extended to wilderness areas.83 Congress
has authority to reclassify an area of a national forest as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System under the Wilderness Act. 4 This
76. H.R. Rep. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1960).
77. 438 U.S. at 713. This holding by the Court has been criticized by several commentators. See, e.g., Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights, and the Narrowing Scope of
Federal Jurisdiction, 30 STAN. L. Rnv. 1111, 1138 (1978) ("The court's holding reflects a
serious misunderstanding of how federal reserved rights may vest."); Fairfax & Tarlock, supra
note 38, at 536 (proposing an alternative reading of the relevant federal laws which would have
permitted the Court to reach the opposite conclusion, namely that Congress accepted aesthetics, preservation, and protection of wildlife as primary purposes of the forest reserves); Note,
Water Law-Quantificationof Water Rights Claimed Under the Implied Reservation Doctrine
for National Forests-UnitedStates v. New Mexico, 438 US. 696 (1978), 54 WASH. L. REV.
873 (1979) (asserting that the decision does not provide adequate protection for the national
forests).
78. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715.
79. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
80. 426 U.S. 128 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 114-115.
82. "[T]he United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on
the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators." 426 U.S. at
138.
83. See supra note 77.
84. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 11311136 (1982)).
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reclassification effectively prohibits all commercial development in the
designated area."
In 1979, the Solicitor for the Interior Department studied whether a
reclassification of national forest lands as a wilderness area impliedly reserved water rights in the area for wilderness purposes.8 6 The Solicitor
concluded that federal reserved water rights did exist to fulfill the primary purposes of wilderness areas.87 However, at least two commentators disputed the Solicitor's conclusion, maintaining that it was
unsupported by case law. 8
The issue did not come before a court until 1985 when a federal
district court ruled in Sierra Club v. Block ("Sierra Club 1")89 that the
federal reserved water rights doctrine applied to wilderness areas. The
district court ruled that the United States held unperfected reserved
water rights claims in the twenty-four wilderness areas located in
Colorado. 90
In Sierra Club 1, plaintiff Sierra Club brought an action against the
Secretary of Agriculture and other federal officials. The complaint
charged that the federal government had failed to claim reserved water
rights in Colorado wilderness areas. Accordingly, the Sierra Club sought
a judicial determination that the federal government holds reserved
water rights in wilderness areas. It also requested an order requiring the
federal government to take whatever action is necessary to protect these
water rights. 91
85. Once land is designated as a wilderness area, it is withdrawn from all commercial
development such as logging, mining, oil and gas leasing, and road-building. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1133(c), (d)(1982). For a more detailed discussion of the Wilderness Act, see Comment,
FederalReserved Water Rights in National Forest Wilderness Areas, 21 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 381, 382-84 (1986).
86. Solicitor's Opinion M-36914, 86 Interior Decisions 553 (1979).
87. The Solicitor concluded that federal reserved water rights exist to fulfill the conservation, recreational, and scientific purposes of congressionally designated wilderness areas. Id. at
609-10. While subsequent Solicitors have modified this 1979 opinion, the section on wilderness
areas remains intact. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 90.
88. Waring & Samelson, Non-IndianFederalReserved Water Rights, 58 DEN. U. L. REV.
783, 791-92 (1981). Waring and Samelson note that the Wilderness Act expressly makes the
purposes of wilderness areas supplemental to the purposes for which national forests and parks
originally were established. Thus, they assert that applying the Court's "primary purpose" test
in New Mexico, the Wilderness Act can be construed as establishing secondary purposes for
which no water was reserved. But see Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), and the
discussion infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
89. 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985). The Secretary of Agriculture was named as a
defendant because in 1906, Congress transferred jurisdiction of the national forests to the Department of Agriculture under the Transfer Act of 1905, ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628.
90. 622 F. Supp. at 862.
91. Id. at 846. For a thorough discussion of the role and duty of the Secretary of Agriculture to assert federal water rights in wilderness areas, see Abrams, Water in the Western Wilderness: The Duty to Assert Reserved Water Rights, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 387.
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The government responded by arguing that since the Wilderness
Act creates wilderness areas out of lands previously designated as national forests, 92 reclassification cannot exceed the purposes of the initial
reservation as a national forest. Thus, the government contended that
because wilderness purposes are secondary to national forest purposes,
Congress did not intend federal water rights to attach to them.9 3
The court in Sierra Club I rejected the government's arguments and
distinguished the Supreme Court's treatment of MUSYA in New Mexico.94 The Wilderness Act, the court held, does not "constitute an attempt to add to the primary purposes of existing reservations," but is
instead "initial legislation creating an entirely new reservation of federal
lands." 95 The court also examined the issue of congressional intent, employing the standard developed by the Supreme Court in Cappaert9 6 and
New Mexico.9 7 Under this standard, a court will infer an intent to reserve
water if previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish
the primary, but not secondary, purposes for which the reservation was
created.9 8
In order to ascertain the primary purposes for which wilderness areas are created, the court examined the Wilderness Act and the several
statements of congressional purpose it contains. The court noted that
Congress mandated that "wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public
purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and
historical use." 99 It observed that, unlike the Organic Administration
Act at issue in New Mexico, both the Wilderness Act and its legislative
history are replete with statements indicating that Congress viewed all of
these purposes as primary and crucial. Therefore, the court concluded
that Congress impliedly reserved enough water to accomplish all of the
92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
93. Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. at 860. The government also argued that "because the
lands had already been withdrawn from the public domain and reserved for national forest
purposes, subsequent wilderness designation did not constitute a 'withdrawal from the public
domain.'" The court held that a wilderness designation does constitute a withdrawal because
the areas are "withdrawn" from use-related laws. Id. at 855.
94. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
95. Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. at 860 (emphasis in original).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
97. See supra text accompanying note 61.
98. Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. at 853.
99. Id. at 858 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1982)). The court also reviewed the remarks of
various members of Congress during legislative debates on the Wilderness Act, in order to
determine the purposes of wilderness areas. For example, Rep. Riehlman, R-N.Y., stated that
"[t]he reason Congress wished to protect the wilderness areas was to 'preserve for the present
and future generations, land in its original state to be used and enjoyed by all who are interested in outdoor life and conservation.'" Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. at 850 (quoting 110
CONG. REC. 17,437 (1964)); Rep. Cleveland, R-N.H., stated that "the primary motivation of
Congress in establishing the wilderness preservation system was to 'guarantee that these lands
will be kept in their original untouched natural state.'" Id.
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purposes of a wilderness area.100 The court emphasized that "water is
the lifeblood of the wilderness areas. Without water, the wilderness
would become deserted wastelands... [and] the very purposes for which
the Wilderness Act was established would be entirely defeated. Clearly,
this result was not intended by Congress." 10 1
Holding that federal water rights vested on the date the individual
wilderness designations were made,10 2 the court ordered the government
to prepare a plan for protecting these rights. 10 3 The government appealed; however, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it did not
have jurisdiction over the matter because the defendants had not yet prepared their plan and, hence, the district court's order was not yet final
and reviewable.1°4
The case was remanded, and in November 1986, the government
filed its report. Two months later, the Sierra Club filed a second action,
Sierra Club v. Lyng ("Sierra Club JJH ")15 challenging the sufficiency of
the plan. The district court called the defendant's three page plan a
"document which reflects a completely inadequate evaluation of the factors ...to be considered in determining how best to protect wilderness
water resources," and ordered the government to submit a more comprehensive plan by September 1, 1987.106 While conceding that reserved
water rights may not be the only means of assuring adequate water supplies in wilderness areas, the court concluded that
the defendants had
10 7
failed to address fully any acceptable alternatives.
During the second trial, the Colorado Water Congress and other
private parties who had intervened as defendants attempted to demonstrate that the doctrine of federal reserved water rights does not apply to
wilderness areas. The intervenors cited a portion of the Wilderness Act
not previously considered by the district court which states that
"[n]othing in this chapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or
denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State
water laws."' 0 8 The intervenors argued that under this section, Congress
intended to "forbid new federal water rights which could interfere with
100. Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. at 862. The court again quoted legislators: "The purpose
of this measure is to afford protection for our priceless wilderness heritage, a heritage that once
destroyed can never be replaced. It is impossible to restore wilderness once it is gone." Id. at
861 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 17,438 (1964) (statement of Rep. Bennett, D-Fla.)).
101. Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. at 862.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 867.
104. Sierra Club v. Lyng, Nos. 86-1153, 86-1154, 86-1155, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. Oct. 8,
1986).
105. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
106. Id. at 1501.
107. Id.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6) (1982), cited in Sierra Club II, 661 F. Supp. at 1492.
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[state-controlled] water projects." 1 °9 The court disagreed, holding that a
"plain reading" of the cited provision indicated that it was "simply a
disclaimer... [under which] Congress meant to do nothing more than to
maintain the status quo of basic water law."' 10 The government obtained
an extension for filing its plan from September 1, 1987, to September 30,
1987. The plan was filed with the district court on September 30, and as
of this writing, the case had not yet been appealed.
The district court's decisions in Sierra Club I and Sierra Club II
provoked strong reactions from state and private water users in Colorado. 11 ' Although the rulings relate only to Colorado wilderness areas,
they are likely to influence similar cases in other western states, including
Nevada, Montana, and Utah." 2 To appreciate the intensity of the dispute provoked by these decisions, it is necessary to examine the prevailing system of water law in the western states.
III.

Western Water Law

A. The Priority System
Generally, water rights in western states are determined by a system
known as "prior appropriation." Under this doctrine, the rights of the
first water user in time are senior to those of subsequent users." 3 Under
this "first in time, first in right" principle, each water user's "priority
date" is fixed on the date his or her use of the water began."I4 The priority system becomes particularly significant in times of shortage
when a
5
junior appropriator may not be entitled to any water at all."
This basic tenet of western water law presents a major point of conflict between western states and the federal government. As previously
discussed, federal courts have ruled that federal reserved water rights
vest on the date the underlying land was reserved, regardless of when
109. 661 F. Supp. at 1492.
110. Id. at 1493.
111. See, e.g., Reid, Wilderness Areas Ruled to Have Water Rights, Wash. Post, Nov. 28,
1985, at A3, col. 1 (district court ruling sent "shock waves through the water industry in the
West"); N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, at 27, col. 5 (Rep. Strang, R-Colo., stated that the ruling
"creates a layer of water rights that is not quantified. It throws the process of the validity of
our [state's] water rights into chaos.").
112. Reid, supra note 111, at A3, col. 3.
113. The doctrine of prior appropriation in the West was apparently derived from Irwin v.
Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855), in which the court judicially enshrined the customs of the miners
who developed the "first in time" concept for their system of water rights in the 19th century.
The doctrine of prior appropriation differs from the system of "riparianism" prevalent in the
East. Riparianism accords an owner of land bordering a watercourse certain rights and privileges in the water. See generally Note, Federal-State Conflicts over the Controlof Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 969-70 (1960).
114. See generally Comment, DeterminingPriorityofFederalReserved Rights, 48 U. COLO.
L. REv. 547, 551-52 (1977).

115. Id.
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actual water use begins." 6 Thus, the federal government holds water
rights senior in time to the rights of states or private parties that appropriate water after the date of the federal reservation. Western states and
private users thus must compete with the federal government for scarce
water supplies.
The problem is exacerbated when the federal government does not
exercise its rights to claim water resources until years after the reservation is created. In this situation, the federal government may preempt
appropriators who had acquired water rights under state law between the
time the reservation was created
and the government's actual assertion
1 17
of its rights to the same water.
Moreover, when the federal government displaces state water users
in this way, the state appropriators are not entitled to compensation." 8
The federal government has no duty to compensate the displaced water
user because its senior claim to the water assures that it did not "take"
anything rightfully belonging to the state appropriators. A subsequent
appropriator is not entitled to compensation because his or her use of the

water was subject to the preexisisting, though unexercised, federal claim.
In short,
the federal government has no duty to pay for what it already
119
owns.
B.

The Primary Purpose Limitation and State Uncertainty

Although the court in Sierra Club I and II established that water
rights are impliedly reserved upon designation of wilderness areas, the
question of how much water is reserved remains. Because the federal
reserved water right remains unquantified,12z and because the water
116. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
117. See Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-State Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55
WASH. L. REV. 751, 756 (1980) ("[The] appropriator downstream from federal reserved land
who finds water available and puts it to use pursuant to state law may not get the top prority
[sic] although he is the first taker.").
118. Boles & Elliot, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal Reserved
Water Rights, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 209, 230 (1980) ("Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of
federal reserved water rights claims has been that they provide the government with a license
to divest water users of their property with no compensation whatsoever."); Comment, supra
note 114, at 552 ("Even though the priority of a water right is usually viewed as an interest in
property for the purpose of due process, the government does not have to compensate these
state appropriators for their 'losses.' ").
119. See generally F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 147; see also Comment, supra note 114, at
552:
[Ulnder the basic theory of reserved rights, when the United States reserves a
portion of land ...

it also reserves water from appropriation ....

A subsequent

appropriator takes what is left, and though he may use the reserved water until the
government exercises its right, he is not entitled to compensation since his use of the
water was always subject to an overriding federal claim.
120. See Comment, supra note 85, at 393 ("[Tlhe precise magnitude of [wilderness reserved
rights] will not be determined until adjudication and quantification.").

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 15:125

needs of a wilderness area are potentially large,121 states like Colorado
fear that vesting reserved rights in the federal government will "lock up"
areas. As a result, the
an undetermined amount of water in wilderness
122
states' future water rights are left uncertain.
Although it is not clear that any water actually would be "locked
up", the states also fear that the unquantified nature of the right will
adversely affect the orderly development of water resources. The
23
Supreme Court acknowledged this concern in Arizona v. California1
when it noted that the financing of the Boulder Canyon Project would
have been impossible had it not "clearly appear[ed] that, at or prior to
the time of constructing such works, vested rights to the permanent use
of the water [would] be acquired." 124 Moreover, the Bureau of Reclamation 1 25 has in the past postponed construction of certain projects until the
water was allocated to the state in which the projects were being built. 126
The doctrine of federal reserved water rights also has discouraged
decisions to invest in water projects. A consulting engineer stated during
congressional testimony:
[With] respect to water rights, there are sufficient clouds over the
validity of state-created water rights caused by the [federal reserved water rights doctrine], that in my opinion, a local agency in
many cases can no longer depend upon those as sufficient assurance of an adequate water supply for a proposed project. 127
121. "[I]n order to fulfill the enumerated purposes and to retain the 'primeval character' of
wilderness areas, it would seem that all waters in wilderness areas should be left in their natural state." Id. at 392.
122. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 114, at 550 n.19 (1977) ("[S]upporters of state water
rights have argued that reserved rights greatly interfere with state administration of water
resources, a function traditionally relegated to state control. Because it is now unclear how
much water the federal government will claim under its reserved rights, state supporters maintain that long-range state planning is upset and that future private development is deterred.");
see also Boles & Elliott, supra note 118, at 213 ("This uncertainty is also a source of frustration
to new water appropriators and state administrators trying to determine what, if any, water
remains available for appropriation."); United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1982),
reh'g denied, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1983) ("A complex society and economy have since flourished
here in reliance on a comprehensive legal system for the allocation of water rights; and municipalities, agriculture and industry throughout Colorado all depend upon the continued existence and availability of water from the rivers of the State.").
123. 282 U.S. 423 (1931).
124. Id. at 459. See also F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 128-30.
125. The Bureau of Reclamation was formed under the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 4, 32
Stat. 388 (codified as amended in 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600e). The early principle of the Act was
that the United States would build irrrigation works from the proceeds of public land sales in
the 16 arid western states in order to encourage settlement in this area. Since then, the purposes of the Act have grown to include the construction of water facilities for hydropower,
municipal, commercial, and industrial uses. 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 110.2 (R.Clark
ed. 1967).
126. F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 128-30.
127. Id. at 129 (quoting consulting engineer Harvey 0. Banks).
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One commentator has maintained that the 500 million dollar Los
Angeles aqueduct would not have been constructed if substantial quantifor allocation
ties of water had been claimed by the federal government
128
commenced.
was
project
the
before
Indians
the
to
C. Federal Reserved Water Rights and State Law
Since federal reserved water rights are created by federal law and are
not subject to state water law, federal claims to water need not be quantified according to state procedures.12 9 Consequently, it is difficult for a
state to maintain a unified and consistent "catalogue" of all water uses
within its borders.13 In addition, because the federal water right is potentially broader than a typical right under state law, as discussed below,
the federal right can conflict with rights recognized under state law. 3 '
Under the state doctrine of prior appropriation, a water appropriator is required to apply his or her water to a "beneficial use" in order to
perfect a water right. 3 2 Traditionally, beneficial uses were limited to
consumptive or commercial water uses, such as agriculture, mining, and
stockwatering uses, and residential and industrial consumption. 33 In
contrast, federal reserved water rights are generally allocated to nonconsumptive uses such as preserving instream flows, providing recreational
and aesthetic resources, and wildlife conservation. Thus, if the federal
government were required to assert its water rights under state law, the
state might not recognize the claim because the federal purposes would
not come within the state's definition of "beneficial use."
However, several western states have recently revised their water
codes to include water preservation in the definition of "beneficial
uses."' 134 Thus, the extent of any actual conflict between a state's beneficial use requirement and the doctrine must be assessed on a state-by-state
basis.
In addition to requiring that water be put to beneficial uses, several
western states also require that an appropriator physically divert the
water from its source in order to perfect a water right. In these states,
128. Id.
129. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976) (holding that "[flederal water
rights are not dependent upon state law or state procedures").
130. See supra note 122.
131. See Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 38, at 521.
132. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133. See generally Wilkinson, Land and Resource Planningin the NationalForests, 64 OR.
L. REV. 210 (1985).
134. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (Deering 1977) ("The use of water for recreation
and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of water.");
see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(3), (4) (1973); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-4307 to 674312 (Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (Supp. 1986); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 536.300 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-29 (1971).
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"in-stream appropriations" which merely leave the water in its natural
state are not recognized.' 3 5 Thus, federal uses such as fish and wildlife
preservation, which require that water remain in its natural state, would
be precluded by this requirement. Because of a lack of uniformity among
on federal reserved
the states, the practical impact of this requirement
136
water rights would vary from state to state.
In sum, three characteristics of federal reserved water rights are incompatible with the state doctrine of prior appropriation: (1) the federal
priority date is determined by the date of the land reservation, not the
date the water is actually used; (2) the federal right is unquantified
which casts uncertainty over state created water rights; and (3) the federal right is not subject to some western states' requirements of beneficial
use and physical diversion.

IV.

The Practical Implications of Wilderness Reserved Water
Rights

Despite state misgivings about the doctrine, it is not clear that applying federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas will significantly
affect state and private water users. The impact of application of the
doctrine to wilderness areas depends on its practical effects as well as its
legal basis. Four practical considerations are of particular importance.
First, because federal reserved water rights vest on the date the land
is reserved, 137 federal water rights in wilderness areas would have little
effect on appropriations made prior to the wilderness designation, since
these prior rights would be senior to the federal rights. The United
States would hold rights senior only to those water appropriators whose
claims were perfected after the designation of a wilderness area. Since
the earliest possible priority date for a wilderness area located anywhere
in the United States is 1964, the effective date of the Wilderness Act,
state water rights perfected before that time would not be affected by the
doctrine. 1 38 Many state wilderness areas were designated in 1980, and
135. See, e.g., California Trout, Inc. v. Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816,
820, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 674 (1979) ("The statutory pattern makes it plain that possession of
some sort must be taken of the water."). However, other western states now allow in-stream
appropriations by the state. See, e.g., Department of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin.,
96 Idaho 440, 444, 530 P.2d 924, 928 (1974) (holding that the Idaho constitution "does not
require actual physical diversion"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (1973) (authorizing the
state to make an instream appropriation).
136. It has been suggested that this variance among the states is itself a sufficient basis for
the federal government to refuse to comply with state law. F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 137
(such variations would create "material and undesirable variations in the local application of
federal laws, policies and programs").
137. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text; see also Sierra Club L 622 F. Supp. 842,
862 (D. Colo. 1985).
138. See Comment, supra note 85, at 395.
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thus have relatively late priority dates."' The federal reserved water
rights accompanying future wildernesss designations would have priority
dates that would be junior to all then-existing claims."
Second, the location of many wilderness areas makes it unlikely that
federal reserved water rights in these areas would actually impair the
rights of other users. In Colorado, for example, wilderness areas are located high in the mountains where many of the streams which supply the
state with water originate. 14 ' In the rare instances when a user needs to
appropriate water above a wilderness area, 42 the diversion would be prohibited only if it interfered with the primary purposes of the wilderness
area. 143 On the other hand, in other states where wilderness areas are
located at lower elevations, the doctrine could have a greater impact on
upstream diverters.
Third, state concerns that the federal reserved water rights would
"lock up" large and unquantified amounts of water in wilderness areas
may be of little practical importance. Because the use of water for wilderness purposes is "nonconsumptive", the water likely would remain in
its free-flowing state, passing through the wilderness areas to downstream users.' 44 In short, because of their late priority date, location,
139. For a discussion of wilderness priority dates, see Colorado Wilderness Act: Hearings
on S. 2916 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Reserved Water of the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1984) (statement of Maggie Fox,
Southwest Director, The Sierra Club).
140. Id.
141. See Kosloff, Waterfor Wilderness: Colorado Court Expands FederalReserved Water
Rights, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10002, 10006 (1986); Comment, supra note 85, at
395.
142. As commentators have noted, few users need to divert water above a wilderness area
since there are few practical uses for water in such remote locations. Kosloff, supra note 141,
at 10006; Comment, supra note 85, at 395.
143. This conclusion has been contested by at least one Coloradan. Ralph Curtis, President of the Colorado Water Congress, testified in June, 1986, before the House Public Lands
Subcommittee:
Our State's history has shown that it is sometimes necessary to divert water
from above or within a wilderness area so that it can be used where it is needed.
Moreover, water storage is best accomplished at higher elevations for use even in the
same basin, so that the water can be released and allowed to flow down the stream
channels for diversion by the greatest number of uses, including farms, cities, and
businesses, when the water is needed. Existing wilderness areas in Colorado are primarily located at the higher elevations where future storage may be needed. The
problem of locating diversion and storage points will only be magnified as wilderness
designations are extended or proceed downstream on Forest Service and [Bureau of
Land Management] lands.
Hearings on H.R. 4233, supra note 3, at 221.
144. As one commentator stated: "Reserved rights in wilderness do not consume water.
They merely assure that what flows today will flow tomorrow." Id. at 332 (statement of Christopher H. Meyer, Counsel for the National Wildlife Federation). See also Abrams, supra note
91, at 389. As Abrams states, "[m]ost designated wilderness areas are relatively remote and
near the headwaters of streams; most state law appropriators, by contrast, are located down-

144
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and nonconsumptive use of water in wilderness areas, federal reserved
water rights in wilderness areas will have less effect on existing water
users than is popularly believed.145
Perhaps the most convincing argument against applying the reserved water rights doctrine to wilderness areas is the federal govern'
ment's ability to assert the "no injury rule"146
against state water
appropriators. This rule, followed in virtually all of the western jurisdictions, requires water users seeking to change their water uses to demonstrate that the change will not harm junior water users. 147 In three
decisions, the Supreme Court has used language similar to the "no injury
14 8
rule" implying that the federal government could invoke this concept.
As a result, the federal government may assert this rule to prevent a
junior user from changing his or her use in a way 49which would adversely
affect the water flow through a wilderness area.1

V.
A.

Legislative Reaction to the Doctrine

Historical Background

From the time the Supreme Court first extended federal reserved
water rights to lands other than Indian reservations in Pelton Dam,5 °
federal legislators from western states have lobbied for a congressional
reversal of the doctrine. The matter has been before Congress almost
continuously since 1956, and legislative interest in this issue remains
15
strong. 1
stream. Thus, a federal reserved [water] right that maintained water in the stream until the
water flowed through the wilderness area would not affect these downstream uses."
145. The court in Sierra Club I stated: "[Ilt is important to note that these reserved rights
will probably have little effect on prior appropriators." Sierra Club I, 622 F. Supp. 842, 862
(D. Colo. 1985).
146. See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo.
53, 61, 550 P.2d 288, 294 (1976) ("[W]here senior users can show no injury by the diversion of
water, they cannot preclude the beneficial use of water by another."); Green v. Chaffee Ditch
Co., 150 Colo. 91, 106, 371 P.2d 775, 783 (1962) ("Equally well established .... is the principle
that junior approriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they
existed at the time of their respective appropriations, and that subsequent to such appropriations they may successfuly resist all proposed changes in points of diversion and use of water
from that source which in any way materially injures or adversely affects their rights." (quoting Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 579, 272 P.2d 629,
631-32 (1954)).
148. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
149. In other words, a user whose right vested prior to the time the federal land was reserved would be prevented from changing the point of his diversion if it were deemed to diminish the flow of water necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of a wilderness area. See
Comment, supra note 85, at 395-96.
150. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
151. See infra notes 152-176 and accompanying text.
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The first bill introduced in Congress regarding reserved water
rights-the "Barrett Bill"' 5 2-- would have subjected the federal government to state law in almost every water-related activity. Not surprisingly, several federal departments opposed the proposal as overly

broad. 153
'
In 1958, the Interior Department submitted the "Agency Bill" 154
for committee consideration, which provided that the reservation of federal lands would not affect any water rights acquired under state law.
Several federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Defense, initially supported this bill, but when it was later modified to deny
federal reserved water rights altogether, the federal agencies withdrew
their support. One commentator described this modification as a "bald
' 155
attempt to enact into law an untenable theory of state supremacy."

B.

The Legislative Reaction of the Colorado Congressional Delegation
Sierra Club I provoked renewed opposition to the federal reserved

water rights doctrine in Colorado and in Congress. When a preliminary
ruling was issued in the case in 1984, United States Senator William L.
Armstrong 156 attached a rider to the then-pending Colorado Wilderness
Bill. 157 Armstrong's amendment would have abolished all federal claims
1 58
to reserved rights in Colorado's existing and future wilderness areas.
When environmentalists opposed the amendment, Armstrong withdrew
59

his support for the entire wilderness bill, and it was never passed. 1

152. Water Rights Settlement Act of 1956, S. 863, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. See 1956 Senate
Hearings 244. The full text of this bill is set forth in Morreale, supra note 31, at 512-15. See
also F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 131.
153. F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 131.
154. HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Irrigationand Reclamation of the House Comm.
on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., series 9 at 131 (1959). The Agency Bill
was submitted on March 28, 1958. It was intended as a substitute for the Barrett Bill and
provided that the withdrawal or reservation of lands would not affect any preexisting or subsequently acquired water right under state law. One commentator suggests that the bill was
never passed because it raised more questions than it answered, such as when the United States
was deemed to have initiated its water rights. Morreale, supra note 31, at 478-80.
155. F. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 132.
156. R-Colo.
157. S. 2916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S10,018 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984).
158. Section 7 of S. 2916 stated:
No provisions of this Act nor any other Act of Congress designating areas in
Colorado as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System, nor any guidelines,
rules, or regulations issued thereunder, shall constitute the establishment of a right to
the use or flow of water in the Federal Government because of the designation ....
Colorado Wilderness Act: Hearings on S. 2916 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and
Reserved Water of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2916].
159. See J. SAX & R. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 546 (1986).
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Senator Armstrong argued that Congress had not intended to reserve any water rights when it created the wilderness system. Such a
step, he believed, would "clearly do serious violence to the West's longstanding system of state water law and would throw into serious jeopardy
the water rights of thousands of Coloradans."' 60 The reaction to Armstrong's amendment was mixed. Private and state water users praised
the proposal, while many environmentalists opposed it."'
Following the demise of the Armstrong proposal, attempts were

made to
resurrect the Colorado Wilderness Bill. Congressman Timothy
162
Wirth

proposed a bill which would have designated 773,675 acres of

new wilderness in Colorado, but the bill did not refer to federal reserved
water rights. 163 This bill died without passage.

In February 1986, Congressman Michael Strang"6 introduced a bill
dealing exclusively with reserved water rights in Colorado wilderness areas. 165 Congressman Strang's proposal would have reversed Sierra Club
I and established alternative procedures by which federal land managers

could seek only minimum instream flows in Colorado wilderness areas.
In effect, this proposal directed
federal land managers to defer to Colo166
rado's law on instream flows.
Supporters of Congressman Strang's bill applauded the idea of requiring the federal government to defer to state law, rather than displace
Colorado's well-established system. 167 However, the bill failed to assuage
the concerns of environmentalists who feared that Colorado's state water
law would not adequately protect streamflows in Colorado wilderness
160. 130 CONG REC. S10,021 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984) (statements of Sen. Armstrong).
161. Compare Hearings on S. 2916, supra note 158, at 414 (statements of John Porter,
farmer) ("[T]erms like 'natural state,' and 'pristine environment,' are nice terms, but they
make me very nervous as an upstream diverter. We think section 7 [of Armstrong's bill] needs
to be in there .. ")with id. at 132 (statement of Maggie Fox, Southwest Representative of the
Sierra Club) ("[Section 7] is both unnecessary and potentially very destructive to the integrity
of the wilderness system in Colorado and nationwide.") and id. at 138 (statement of Michael
Scott, Regional Director of The Wilderness Society) ("[The] language [of section 7] is categorically unacceptable to us.")
162. D-Colo.
163. H.R. 34, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H66 (1986).
164. R-Colo.
165. H.R. 4233, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H570 (1986).
166. For a more detailed examination of the Strang proposal, see infra notes 169-174 and
accompanying text.
167. "Rather than displacing an established State program, [Strang's bill] directs U.S.
agencies to utilize Colorado's program, unless it is shown to be plainly inadequate .... [Tihe
doctrine of implied reserved water rights is a slender peg on which to rest the policy of the
United States in water matters." Hearings on H.R. 4233, supra note 3,at 205 (statement of
Larry Simpson, Manager of the Colorado Water Conservancy District). Another Colorado
state water official expressed concern "about the disruptive effect of a federal intrusion of unquantified rights that do not respect our well-established state water rights system, a system
that is understood and observed by all other water users in the state." Id. at 159 (statement of
David H. Getches, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources).
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areas. 16 8 Thus, this bill also died without passage.
Congressman Strang's bill was the first to deal exclusively with federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas, and thus merits closer examination. The bill would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to claim minimum instream flows for wilderness areas in accordance
with Colorado law, which permits instream appropriations to "preserve
the natural environment to a reasonable degree."' 16 9 However, these instream appropriations historically have been limited to the minimal
amount of water needed to keep fish alive.' 70 Congressman Strang's bill
did not use the language of the Colorado instream statute, but instead
would have limited the federal water appropriations to the minimum
' 71
amount necessary to preserve "aquatic life to a reasonable degree."'
Congressman Strang did not specify whether this provision would have
allowed the federal government to appropriate water to serve recreational, scenic, or educational purposes, or to preserve plants and wildlife
other than fish. In other words, the bill may have authorized the Secretary to do what cannot be done under Colorado law.
The bill also prohibited federal water appropriations "during
drought events," a caveat which would have left the federal government
72
without water rights during times of critical need in wilderness areas.
In addition, the bill provided that "nothing in this section shall be construed... to deprive the people of the State of Colorado of the beneficial
use of those waters available by law and by interstate and international
compacts."'' 73 As one commentator has noted, "[r]ead literally, this language completely eliminates whatever minimal water rights would
other174
wise be allowed [to the federal government] under the bill."'
There is no Colorado wilderness legislation currently pending before
Congress. The members of the Colorado delegation report that they are
168. "[T"he solution proposed in H.R. 4233 is no solution at all, but an abdication of federal responsibility in the guise of comity." Id. at 337 (statement of Christopher Meyer, counsel
for the National Wildlife Federation).
169. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973).
170. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Water Conservation Bd., 197 Colo.
469, 480, 594 P.2d 570, 578 (1979), in which the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the Colorado Water Board's determination that the appropriation of minimum flows necessary to preserve certain fish species also would suffice to maintain the rest of the natural environment.
171. H.R. 4233, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2, 132 CONG. REC. E451 (1986).

Section 2

provides:
The Secretary is authorized... to claim where necessary in a manner consistent
with ... [the] laws governing water appropriation in the State of Colorado, such
minimum instream flows of the waters of natural streams and lakes within designated
wilderness areas as may be required to preserve and protect, except during drought
events, minimum instream flows to maintain aquatic life to a reasonable degree.
172. Id. § 2.
173. Id. § 2(b).
174. Hearings on H.R. 4233, supra note 3, at 337 (statement of Christopher Meyer, counsel
for the National Wildlife Federation).
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committed to determining whether federal reserved water rights will apply to wilderness areas before drafting any new wilderness legislation.175
Thus, the political debate over the reserved water rights doctrine in wilderness areas has effectively blocked the passage of any new wilderness
designation at this time, creating an additional concern for

environmentalists.
Colorado's representatives are not alone in their concern that extending the doctrine of federal reserved water rights to wilderness areas
may adversely affect the state's available water supply. In 1985, for example, legislation was introduced which would have expressly denied
176
federal reserved water rights in 939,400 acres of wilderness in Nevada.
C. The Effect of the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine on
Wilderness Legislation
While the practical effects of federal reserved water rights in wilder177
ness areas may not be as significant as the current debate suggests,
current case law and statutes are inadequate to resolve the important
legal issues presented. Federal legislators are hesitant to enact new wilderness legislation, thereby stalling the expansion of the nation's existing
wilderness system.1 78 A legislative compromise is necessary to protect
state and federal water interests and to move wilderness legislation
through the political process.

VI.

A Proposed Legislative Solution

While the laws of western states are beginning to reflect environ175. Telephone conversations with legislative aides to Congressman Campbell (who replaced Strang in January of 1987) and to Senator Armstrong, Feb. 10, 1987 and Sept. 17, 1987.
During the conversations on Sept. 17, 1987, the aides to Senator Armstrong stated that he has
proposed a meeting with all parties involved in the Sierra Club v. Lyng litigation to discuss the
reserved rights issue. While the parties were expected to meet and reach a compromise in the
fall of 1987, they have not yet done so.
176. Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System: Hearing on H.R. 1686
Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985). Section 402(b) of this bill provided: "Nothing in this Act shall
be construed to limit the exercise of valid water rights as provided under Nevada State Law,
nor shall it constitute an express or implied reservation of water rights in favor of the Federal
Government."
177. See supra notes 137-149 and accompanying text.
178. Opponents to the doctrine have remarked: "If [appropriating all the water in wilderness areas] is the aim of wilderness legislation, our District is not interested in seeing any more
wilderness areas designated in Colorado." Hearings on H.R. 4233, supra note 3, at 205 (statement of Larry Simpson, Manager of the Colorado Water Conservancy District); ". .. [W]e
oppose the passage of any additional wilderness designation in Colorado, unless the legislation
contains a Congressional declaration that implied federal reserved water rights are not created
as a result of wilderness designation." Id. at 225 (statement of Ralph Curtis, President of the
Colorado Water Congress).
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mental concerns, 179 many legislators continue to resist the idea of allowing the federal government to claim reserved water rights for
wilderness areas. A wilderness bill for a western state must address several issues in order to provide an acceptable compromise between the
Sierra Club I approach and total refusal to apply the doctrine to wilderness areas. While the states prefer Congressman Strang's proposal, environmentalists fear that the Strang bill would severely handicap the
adequately to protect valuable water flows
federal government's ability
180
areas.
wilderness
within
The first step towards a more satisfactory compromise is to determine whether federal reserved water rights should apply to wilderness
areas. Under the Supreme Court's analysis in prior reserved water rights
cases, t8 1 reserved water rights should indeed accompany a wilderness
designation. The secondary nature of the withdrawal of land for wilderness designation does not negate a federal claim for the water flowing on
the land. In Arizona v. California,'8 2 the Supreme Court held that reserved water rights attached to a national recreation area and a national
wildlife refuge, both of which were secondary withdrawals.' Moreover,
by its very provisions, the Wilderness Act created new reservations with
new purposes, 184 unlike MUSYA in New Mexico which merely broadSince it appears that Congress
ened the purposes of national forests.'
intended all of these new wilderness purposes to be "primary", 8 6 reto wilderness areas under the New
served water rights should attach
8 7
Mexico primary purpose test.'
While Congress does not have an affirmative obligation to adopt the
judicially implied doctrine of federal reserved water rights,' 8 8 it could
choose to follow the lead of the courts in this matter by issuing a legislative pronouncement that reserved water rights accompany wilderness
designations. The Wilderness Act, created by Congress, furthers the
worthy national policy of ensuring that certain federal lands, valuable for
their pristine beauty and wealth of natural resources, will remain in their
natural state. In order to design legislation that would truly be a compromise, however, Congress should declare that reserved water rights in
wilderness areas are subject to legislative restraints designed to protect
the state interests involved. In this way, a compromise would not be
179. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 40-82 and accompanying text.

182. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
183. Id. at 601.
184. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.

186. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
188. Under the concept of separation of powers as laid out by Articles I, II, and III of the
Constitution, Congress is given the responsibility for initially creating and enacting laws.
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"loaded" toward those who favor unrestricted federal wilderness water
rights by allowing Supreme Court precedent to control legislative policymaking.
The most effective means of accommodating legitimate state water
concerns would be for the federal legislation to state expressly the
amount of water the federal government is claiming when it designates a
wilderness area. Thus, Congressional intent to reserve water for wilderness areas would not have to be implied as in the past, but would be
expressed in any new legislation. This approach is superior to measures
such as the Strang proposal which would require that federal water
rights be determined by state law. While Congress typically has deferred
to state law on water use issues, federal deference in the context of reserved water rights for wilderness areas is undesirable. The very reason
that the Constitution contains a Supremacy Clause is to provide Congress with control over the effects of its laws, by precluding state subordination of federal goals to local interests.'t8 This clearly is an area in
which the federal law should be allowed to preempt relevant state laws1 90
because, as discussed in Part II, state law requirements would impede the
full attainment of federal objectives. A uniform, national water policy
for protecting wilderness areas is more desirable than a piecemeal, stateby-state determination of wilderness water rights. Thus, Congress could
declare, using its powers under the Property and Supremacy Clauses, 19 1
that as a matter of federal law, reserved water rights exist in federal wilderness areas to fulfill the primary purposes of these areas.
The next issue is how much water the federal government should
claim by the terms of its legislation. In order to achieve the preservationoriented purposes underlying creation of wilderness areas, the federal
government should reserve more water than the amount needed to preserve aquatic life. As its provisions and legislative history suggest, the
Wilderness Act was designed to protect a much wider range of environmental values including aesthetics, scenery, education, history, and conservation.1 92 Thus, Congress should establish parameters for wilderness
reserved water rights that parallel the language of the Wilderness Act
189. Professor Tribe states in his treatise: "Thus, state action must be invalidated if its
effect is to discourage conduct that federal action seeks to encourage." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (1978). Another commentator notes: "When federal action is
inspired by a desire to avoid multiple and conflicting state regulation, or to circumvent the
parochial attitude of local authorities, the context strongly suggests that the states should not
be allowed to continue to govern matters .... ." Note, Pre-emption as a PreferentialGround: A
New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 216 (1959). These concepts are particularly important in the reserved water rights context since the federal goal of keeping water in
its natural state for wilderness purposes is at least perceived by states as a threat to their use of
the water for consumptive purposes.
190. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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itself, rather than the language of a state law that severely restricts instream appropriations. The legislation should expressly permit the federal government to claim sufficient instream flows to preserve the
recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical
purposes of the wilderness area designated. 93 The federal government
then could claim the instream flows necessary to preserve the natural
character and habitats of the wilderness area. By expressly defining federal reserved water rights, Congress could protect the environmental
value of each wilderness area. This concept would be particularly helpful
in those states that do not recognize environmental concerns as a beneficial use, or do not permit instream appropriations.
A chief complaint by western states is that the current federal reserved water rights doctrine allows the federal government to claim an
unquantified, "blank check" amount of water. To protect state interests,

therefore, Congress should precisely quantify the amount of water it is
claiming for wilderness areas. The legislation should state precisely how
much water the federal government will claim during each of the various
seasons, and during drought periods should they occur.'9 4 An automatic
193. The language adopted should parallel that of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)
(1982).
194. To resolve the problem of quantifying federal reserved water rights, some commentators have suggested that general adjudicatory proceedings should be held to quantify the rights
of all claimants to a water supply, including the federal government. See, e.g., Elliott &
Balcomb, Deference to State Courts in the Adjudication of Reserved Water Rights, 53 DEN. U.
L. REV. 643, 661 (1976); Note, Adjudication of Indian andFederal WaterRights in the Federal
Courts, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 557-63 (1975); Note, Adjudication of FederalReserved
Water Rights, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 161, 167-68 (1970). A general adjudication is in effect a
statutory class action in which, after proving their rights, claimants obtain a decree setting
forth each claimant's rights, specifying the date of appropriation, amount of water due, season,
type of use, and so forth. See J. SAX & R. ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 574.
The federal government could be joined in this state proceeding pursuant to the 1952
McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), which allows the United States to be joined as
a party in state water proceedings. The McCarran Amendment provides:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for
the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State
law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit.
Id.
Courts have applied this provision to the federal reserved water right. Colorado River
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United States v. District Court ex
rel. Water Div. Number 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971); United States v. District Court ex rel. Eagle
County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
While using proceedings under the McCarran Amendment to quantify federal reserved
water rights sounds appealing in theory, such adjudications sometimes involve thousands of
claimants and, as a result, can take years to resolve. One commentator has characterized the
problems with the procedure as follows: "The most frequently voiced criticisms of general
adjudications in which the United States has been joined as a party pursuant to the McCarran
Amendment are (that it is] too expensive, too time-consuming, promote[s] overreaching, exac-
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denial of the reserved right during times of water shortage, as suggested
by Congressman Strang, would severely threaten the plant, wildlife, and
fish populations in a wilderness area.
To assist the states further in their water planning, the legislation
should direct the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a "catalogue" of
water rights, estimating the current and future water needs of wilderness
areas on an area-by-area basis. In addition, the Secretary should indicate
the amount of water needed by private appropriators.
The legislation should prescribe controls on future exercise of federal reserved water rights by requiring the federal government to give
notice of its intended appropriation to all water users who may be affected by the federal claims. Federal appropriations effected without
proper notice would obligate the federal government to compensate displaced users. 195
To increase the protection given to federal water rights, the "no injury" rule1 96 should be included in the legislation. With the "no injury"
rule, the federal government could ensure that any changes in use, even
changes by senior water users, would not lessen the flow of water available to any wilderness area.
Finally, the legislation should allow for state administration of the
federal reserved water right. In this respect, the states in which federal
wilderness areas lie could ensure that the amount of water the federal
government claimed is indeed being used for wilderness purposes. While
the law on state administration of federal water rights is not entirely
clear, at least one court has held that states have this power under the
197
McCarran Amendment.
The Congessional delegation from New Mexico recently proposed a
bill containing federal reserved water rights language for the El Malpais
Wilderness in New Mexico. 198 Such a proposal may be a step in the right
erbate[s] differences and promote[s] distrust, and reach[es] uneven results." White, McCarran
Amendment Adjudication-Problems, Solutions, Alternatives, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV.

619, 626 (1987). Thus, by having the federal government quantify its reserved rights outright
pursuant to federal legislation, resolution of the reserved water rights problem would occur
much sooner.
195. See Note, Adjudication of FederalReserved Water Rights, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 161,
171 (1970).
196. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
197. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). See Federal Youth Center v. District Court, 195 Colo. 55,
575 P.2d 395 (1978); see also supra note 194.
198. H.R. 403, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Section 509(a) of the proposed bill states:
"Congress expressly reserves to the United States the minimum amount of water required to
carry out the purposes for which the national monument, the conservation area, and the wilderness areas are designated under this Act." According to a legislative aide to Senator Arm-

strong (R-Colo.), despite the controversy over wilderness water, the New Mexico Senators are
proceeding with the bill as introduced because the Senators and state leaders feel that any

potential problems are moot since the El Malpais Wilderness governed by the bill has little
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direction, and may help to encourage legislative resolution of the reserved water rights problem.
No one piece of legislation will completely satisfy state governments,
federal interests, environmentalists, and private water users. The legislative scheme suggested above represents balanced concessions, making
possible continued development towards preserving and expanding the
nation's wilderness lands. The problem might best be approached by examining basic principles of constitutional law. The above solution attempts to preserve the federal governments's priority in policy-making
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, while granting the states more certainty in planning for their water needs.
Conclusion
Under the federal reserved water rights doctrine, the federal government is deemed impliedly to have reserved enough water to fulfill the
primary purposes for which it has withdrawn federal land from the public domain and reserved it for a specific national purpose. The doctrine
historically has been applied to Indian reservations, military facilities,
national monuments, national parks, and national forests. It was not until 1985 that the doctrine was extended to wilderness areas. 199
The federal reserved water rights doctrine conflicts with the western
states' system of prior appropriation and has fueled a growing controversy in the semiarid West.2"' Federal legislators from Colorado have
sought to overturn Sierra Club I by introducing amendments to the Colorado Wilderness Act which would expressly preclude federal reserved
water rights in Colorado's existing and future wilderness areas. None of
these amendments has been adopted and the legislators are currently attempting to reach a compromise before proceeding with new legislation. 0 ' Thus, the issue of federal reserved water rights in wilderness
areas remains unresolved and has impeded the enactment of new wilderness legislation in many states.
A legislative solution is best approached with a constitutional view.
Under the Supremacy and Property Clauses, the federal government can
upset state-created water rights when it withdraws federal land. Without
adequate restraints, this exercise of federal power adversely affects state
water planning and policy-making. Through carefully crafted legislation, however, Congress can use its authority under these two clauses to
protect federal wilderness areas while accommodating state water needs.
water in it anyway. Telephone interview with legislative aide to Senator Armstrong (Sept. 17,
1987).
199. See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 116-136 and accompanying text.
201.

See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
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This Note proposes elements of a legislative compromise which
would use the supremacy of federal law to address local as well as national water needs. The legislation would define the federal right as a
matter of federal law, and would provide for explicit quantification of the
right in federal legislation so as to facilitate state water planning. While
complex problems remain, a compromise could be better encouraged if
the reserved water rights doctrine were perceived not as a federal wild
card, blank check, or intrusion of Damoclean magnitude, but as a device
by which states can incorporate environmental concerns into their water
planning philosophy.
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